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446 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
ance pay affect the displaced workers'
search in a minimal way.''^ ^
Similar arguments were made concern-
ing the role of the variable "other weekly
income." Again the regression model
showed that "[wjhen combined with
other variables, other weekly income
loses all its force.''^'' Still, Lipsky argued.
It is clear that other weekly income and
duration of unemployment are positively
related. This clearly demonstrates the influ-
ence of a working spouse on the labor mar-
ket experience of the terminated workers."*
From the author's discussion of the
impact of severance pay and other week-
ly income, one gets the impression that
he did not really comprehend the results
of his regression equation. When the
age variable is separated from the zero-
order correlations between the duration
of unemployment and the independent
variables of severance pay and other
weekly income, the earlier associations
'"/bid.
"Ibid., p. 202.
break down. This suggests chat age was
acting as an intervening variable be-
tween the other independent variables
and the dependent measure. It is un-
fortunate that Lipsky did not report any
partial correlation coefficients for these
variables to test for this alternative ex-
planation of his data.
The substantive issues outlined above
lead one to believe that Lipsky's con-
clusions cannot be justified solely on the
basis of his analysis. Hopefully, some
of the questions raised will stimulate
more careful consideration of the com-
plexities involved in evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of interplant-transfer schemes.
Until these issues can be adequately
incorporated into such studies, the real
contributions of programs designed to
assist workers involved in a plant clos-
ing will not be understood clearly.
THOMAS A. KOCHAN
Research Assistant
Industrial Relations Research Institute
University of Wisconsin
Reply
THE design of policies intended toaid workers who are threatened with
displacement involves issues of a com-
plex and difficult nature. The need for
careful analysis of the issues is empha-
sized by Thomas Kochan's comment on
my recent article.^ In that article I tried
to point out the limitations of my analy-
sis, the difficulties of generalizing on the
basis of a case study, and the tentative
nature of my conclusions. Space did not
allow a full elaboration of these prob-
'David B. Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and
Terminated Workers: A Case Study," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 23, No. 2
(January 1970), pp. 191-206.
lems; now Kochan has performed a
useful service by heightening our aware-
ness of them. However, I cannot believe
he has done any real damage to my cen-
tral argument and conclusions.
It is noteworthy that Kochan begins
his comment with a straightforward fac-
tual error. He says, "the sample of ter-
minated workers used in the analysis
was drawn from among 230 workers
who luere still employed at one of the
four plants..." (italics added). Kochan
has misinterpreted my explanation of
the selection of the sample. At the time
the sample was selected, all the workers
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chosen for interviewing had been ter-
minated.2
Kochan is concerned because the sam-
ple was confined to only one of the
four labor markets in which workers
were displaced. It might have been a
worthwhile exercise to interview workers
displaced at the other three plant sites,
but as the sole field investigator, I was
limited in the amount of time and money
at my disposal. I therefore concentrated
on the workers who were terminated at
the Walter Baker Company in Dor-
chester, Massachusetts, which was by far
the largest of the four affected plants.
Of the 1,800 workers affected, 825 had
been employed at this plant. Although I
was unable to reach workers terminated
at the other three plants, I was able to
interview almost all of the workers who
were transferred to General Foods' new
plant at Dover, Delaware from the Jell-O
plant at LeRoy, New York. Comparing
the characteristics, experiences, and atti-
tudes of the transferred LeRoy workers
with the transferred Walter Baker work-
ers, I discovered no systematic differ-
ences. Of course, this does not imply
necessarily that the experiences of the
displaced LeRoy workers were identical
to the experiences of the terminated
Walter Baker workers. Nevertheless, the
state of the economy in 1964 and 1965,
the common characteristics and work
experiences of the workers involved, as
well as the identical company policies
which affected them, lead me to conclude
that generalizations for all 1,800 affected
workers based on a study of more than
800 in one labor market are not com-
pletely invalid.
The real question is whether one can
make generalizations about the experi-
ences of other workers caught in circum-
Hbid., p. 192.
stances similar to those in this case study.
Hopefully, I was cautious about any
generalizations offered on the basis of
this one small study. However, it can
be pointed out that using case studies
in an effort to try to generalize about
larger groups of workers is a time-hon-
ored tradition in labor market econom-
ics. Through repetition and replication
of related experiments, labor economists
have been able to overcome the idio-
syncratic complexion of individual case
studies and to arrive at some truths
about how workers behave in the labor
market. It is a little late in the day for
Kochan to question a method which
apparently has served the ends of labor
market research so well.
Kochan also shows concern for what
he calls "systematic differences in the
timing and circumstances of the expo-
sure to the labor market" of the ter-
minated workers. One might worry about
this problem if a relatively large number
of Walter Baker workers had been en-
tering a relatively small, isolated labor
market. Obviously when a large and con-
stant stream of workers is entering such
a market, the timing and "exposure"
of a single worker's entry can affect sig-
nificantly his ability to gain employment.
But this was not the case with the Walter
Baker workers; they were entering a
large, metropolitan labor market con-
taining more than a million jobs of every
conceivable nature. Further, every mean-
ingful index—unemployment rate, em-
ployment level, etc.—showed no signifi-
cant change over the period the Walter
Baker workers were reentering the Bos-
ton area labor market. The timing of
entry of this relative handful of workers
into a vast labor market could alter
only negligibly the experience of any
one of them.
In analyzing the impact of displace-
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ment on workers electing termination, I
concentrated on duration of unemploy-
ment as the dependent variable. It is
beyond me how Kochan concludes from
this that I assumed "the need for eco-
nomic security was the major criterion
influencing the workers' decisions." No-
where in my article is there inference
or suggestion that I made such an as-
sumption. As a matter of fact, I was
concerned only indirectly with uncover-
ing the factors which may have moti-
vated worker decisions and their general
behavior. The research was undertaken
to discover patterns of an experiential,
rather than volitional nature. Indeed,
as far as I could determine, workers
seemed to decide to terminate or relo-
cate with the company on the basis of
a complex and varied set of factors, some
revolving around the notion of economic
security, others centering on factors such
as "tastes" and family and community
ties. Kochan clearly misses an unstated
im^plication of my findings: if the work-
ers had based their decisions wholly on
the objective of maximizing their eco-
nomic security (in the sense of mini-
mizing their duration of unemployment)
then most made the "wrong" decision
about staying. If workers truly had
sought to insure their economic security,
then the rational decision would have
been to transfer with the company—the
only route that guaranteed continued
employment. One can infer from their
behavior that workers had other objec-
tives in mind in addition to economic
security.
It is true, however, that my central
conclusion related solely to the criterion
of minimization of unemployment for
the workers involved. When I concluded
diat "corporate relocation expenditures
tended to benefit those workers who
would have been affected least adversely
by displacement," I was speaking only
in terms of the expected duration of
their unemployment. Had the relocated
workers elected to terminate rather than
transfer, the duration of their unem-
ployment would have been significantly
lower than that actually endured (on
the average) by the workers who did
elect termination.
While individual workers probably
weighed other factors equally or more
heavily than expected duration of un-
employment in making their decisions,
I do not think Kochan is correct in
arguing that this invalidates the use
of the criterion. Whatever motivated
their decisions, it is an indisputable fact
that for a great many of them the con-
sequences of staying included a pro-
tracted period of unemployment. In
deciding to terminate, a worker may
have discounted the impact of the
decision on his future economic welfare.
However, after eighteen weeks of un-
employment (the average endured by
the persons in the sample), he was likely
to place a different weight on economic
security.
In this connection 1 have no quarrel
with the March and Simon model. It
is a useful way of thinking about why
individuals may stay or leave organiza-
tions. The major point, however, is that
"the real importance of job security in
the eyes of the workers" at the time of
their decisions to move or stay may bear
little relation to the importance they
place on job security after a period of
time has elapsed and they come to rec-
ognize the consequences of their decision.
The usefulnes of duration of unem-
ployment as a measure of the adverse
effects of displacement depends partly
on the perspective one assumes. Certain-
ly, from society's point of view, dura-
tion of unemployment is an extremely
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significant measure of adverse effects.
Workers may have made their decision
on the basis of any number of factors—
community loyalties, family ties, percep-
tions of limited upward mobility within
the organization, as well as calculations
of expected unemployment. The most
immediate cost to society, however, is
the unemployment which results from
the plant shutdown. Admittedly, sever-
ing family ties may create social prob-
lems, but their costs are not nearly as
immediate nor easy to calculate as the
costs generated by men without work.
These costs include not only unemploy-
ment compensation and welfare benefits
but also, as I pointed out in my article,
"the waste of productive resources,
which result[s] from real unemployment
among those terminated, from the move-
ment out of the labor market by dis-
couraged job seekers, and from move-
ment into inferior positions which [do]
not tap the full productive potential
of a few workers.... "^
Thus, when Kochan says "the real
importance of job security in the eyes
of the workers cannot be determined,"
he is raising an issue I never intended to
discuss. It is not necessary to raise the
issue if one principally is concerned not
with why workers leave organizations,
but what happens to them after they do.
Kochan also objects to length of un-
employment as a criterion because "it
fails to measure the quality of the jobs
accepted by the terminated workers." I
clearly stated, however, "that the longer
a man had been unemployed, the more
likely it was that he would be forced to
take a lower wage and/or lower-skilled
job."* No data were supplied to substan-
tiate the relation because it did not seem
worth elaboration given the length of
"Ibid., p. 205.
*Ibid., p. 197.
the article and the fact that it was not
central to my analysis.
However, since Kochan raises the ques-
tion, I am pleased" to supply the data
to substantiate the claim. In Table 1
it can be seen that the "quality of jobs
accepted varied inversely with the length
of unemployment experienced by the
terminated workers." The data cover 82
of the original 116 workers in the sam-
ple. The remaining workers had not
obtained even one job at the time of
their interview. These workers had been
without work for at least twenty-one
weeks (in most cases from forty to fifty-
two weeks).
The first job obtained by the displaced
workers was sometimes of short tenure.
Workers would hold a job briefly, then
move on to something they considered
better, or fall back into the ranks of the
unemployed. In fact, the behavior of
this sample of displaced workers was
similar to that of young workers entering
the labor force for the first time. The
displaced workers tended to do some
job shopping before settling down.
Therefore, looking at the wage obtained
on the first job after leaving Walter
Baker may be somewhat misleading.
Nevertheless, Table 1 seems to indicate
that the longer a man was unemployed,
the lower the relative wage he had to
accept on gaining reemployment. On
the other hand, the eleven workers who
suffered no unemployment received a
weekly wage averaging about 17 percent
higher than that paid by Walter Baker;
these workers were almost all skilled
maintenance men. It should be noted
that the relationship was strongest at
the extremes of the unemployment
range. There appears to have been
little deterioration in earnings for work-
ers out of work from one to fifteen weeks.
Although this sample was too small to
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Table 7. Relationship Between Length of Unemployment and Wage Change
for Walter Baker Terminated Workers.
Weeks of
Unemployment
0
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26 or more
Sample
Number of Workers
Obtaining Jobs
11
12
U
12
10
14
9
82
Mean Wage on
Walter Baker Job
(?)
$102
106
101
104
101
109
101
104
Mean Wage on
First Job
After Leaving
Walter Baker
(2)
8119
105
96
102
92
86
75
97
Ratio of (2) to (?)
X 700
117
99
95
98
91
79
74
93
generalize about the relationship be-
tween duration o£ unemployment and
quality of jobs accepted, for this group
it seems valid to say that duration of
unemployment is a good proxy for de-
terioration in wages accepted by workers
on their new jobs.
Kochan appears to fault my study be-
cause I did not simply ask the workers
what factors entered into their decisions.
He could not know that I conducted
in-depth interviews with all workers in
the sample and did indeed ask them
why they had made their decisions. All
workers interviewed had an opportunity
to express freely their attitudes, opin-
ions, and reactions to the shutdown and
relocation of the Walter Baker plant's
operations.
Displaced Walter Baker workers gave
a variety of reasons for not relocating
to Dover. Principally, they included dis-
satisfaction with the Dover job, particu-
larly because of anticipated pay reduc-
tions but also because of a somewhat
illogfical anxiety about security of em-
ployment in Dover; dislike of the Dover
area as a place to live; family and com-
munity ties in the Boston area; age, for
those nearing retirement; and finally.
the belief (often mistaken) that it would
be easy to obtain a new job in the Bos-
ton area.
Kochan claims that one only need
know that salaried workers accounted
for a high proportion of the transferred
workers and a low proportion of the
terminated workers to be able to predict
that "terminators were likely to experi-
ence longer periods of unemployment
than the transferees." He bases this as-
sertion on the fact that blue-collar work-
ers have consistently higher rates of
unemployment than white-collar work-
ers. However, Kochan has constructed an
invalid syllogism.
The first premise in the syllogism
Kochan himself acknowledges to be in-
correct: that a salaried/hourly occupa-
tional dichotomy, appropriate to my
data, is the same as a blue-collar/white-
collar dichotomy. The second incorrect
premise is that national rates of unem-
ployment for white- and blue-collar
workers can be used to predict the dura-
tion of unemployment for a sample of
salaried and hourly terminated workers.
There is no necessary relation between
the rate of unemployment and the dura-
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tion of unemployment for particular oc-
cupational groups.
The diflSculty of predicting the dura-
tion of unemployment on the basis of
the rate of unemployment for a given
occupational group can be seen by ex-
amining the experience of managers,
officials, and proprietors. In 1969 the
unemployment rate for this occupational
group was a mere 0.9 percent.^ Yet over
19 percent of those unemployed in the
group went fifteen weeks or more with-
out work. By comparison, among all
those unemployed, 13 percent were un-
employed fifteen weeks or more.^ The
probability that a manager will suffer
a long-term period of joblessness, given
that he is unemployed, is higher than
for all other occupations, even though
the jobless rate among managers is very
low.
The regression analysis used in my
article did not support the notion that
occupational status acted as a moderator
variable. I did not enter occupational
status directly in the analysis (it would
have required a dummy variable, pos-
sibly of more than two levels) but in-
stead relied on the variable "weekly wage
before termination." This, in fact, served
as an excellent proxy for occupation
and/or skill level. The results showed
no significant relationship between un-
employment duration and weekly wage.
Further, the variable served to reduce
the unexplained variance in the de-
pendent variable by only .0021. One can
argue that threshold effects might be
important here, but bivariate analyses
"U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Report
of the President, March 1970, p. 232.
"Computed from ibid., pp. 229, 232, and 239.
On an annual average basis, of 76,438 unem-
ployed managers, officials, and proprietors,
15,000 (19.6%) were unemployed 15 weeks or
more in 1969. Among unemployed operatives,
15.6% were unemployed 15 weeks or more.
of unemployment duration and either
weekly wage or occupational status did
not show this to be the case.
Therefore I think Kochan is clearly
wrong about the role of the occupational
variable, and the need to disaggregate
the data by occupational status.
Note must be taken of Kochan's ef-
fort to question my conclusion that
"individuals who transferred possessed
nearly opposite characteristics in com-
parison to those who suffered difficult
reemployment experiences." First, of
course, I was speaking of tendencies—
the two groups were not mutually ex-
clusive. Kochan claims that what I
"really found was that within the group
of terminated workers, those who experi-
enced longer durations of unemploy-
ment varied from the mean character-
istics of the transferred group as a
whole." If this was all I did, Kochan
might be correct. However, Kochan ig-
nores a significant intermediate step
used to support the conclusion. I first
showed that terminated workers as a
whole possessed several significantly dif-
ferent characteristics from transferred
workers. Only then did I look within
the terminated group to examine the
characteristics of workers with difficult
reemployment experiences. Thus, termi-
nated workers differed significantly from
relocated workers on such factors as num-
ber of dependents, sex, education, and
family status. Terminated workers with
difficult reemployment experiences dif-
fered even more significantly from re-
located workers on those same factors.
Finally, Kochan criticizes my interpre-
tation of the role of severance pay and
other weekly income in the reemploy-
ment experience of the terminated
workers.
I really do not understand the basis
of Kochan's disagreement with me on
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the issue of severance pay. It is true that
a simple cross-tabular analysis of the
relation between severance pay and
weeks of unemployment seemed to show
a somewhat positive relation between
the two variables.'^  But Kochan is mis-
taken in stating that this was the evi-
dence I used to conclude that "large
amounts of severance pay affect the dis-
placed workers' search in a minimal
way." Rather, it was the evidence in
the regression analysis showing sever-
ance pay to be an insignificant deter-
minant of length of unemployment
which led me to that conclusion. My
dictionary tells me that "min imal"
means "smallest possible," and that was
exactly what I meant to say. I could
have said that severance pay did not
affect reemployment success at all—a
statement Kochan would no doubt pre-
fer. But it seemed to me that, given the
limitations of my study, the qualified
conclusion was the preferred alternative.
Perhaps it was a little rash of me to
say that the relationship between other
weekly income and duration of unem-
ployment "clearly demonstrates the in-
fiuence of a working spouse on the labor
market experience of the terminated
workers."* Nevertheless, the regression
analysis indicated other weekly income
to be significantly and positively related
to length of unemployment, even when
the effects of age and number of de-
pendents were accounted for.**
Kochan suggests, "When the age vari-
able is separated from the zero-order
correlations between the duration of un-
employment and the independent vari-
ables of severance pay and other weekly
'Lipsky, "Interplant Transfer and Terminated
Workers," pp. 200-201.
"Ibid., p. 202.
•The regression coefficient was significant at
the 10 percent level. Ibid., p. 204.
income, the earlier associations break
down." He suspects that partial correla-
tion coefficients would cast some light
on the question.
In Table 2 the simple (product-mo-
ment) correlation coefficients between
the dependent variable (weeks of un-
employment) and the independent vari-
ables are shown.i" In addition, the
partial correlation coefficients between
the dependent and independent varia-
bles with age (X2) held constant are
presented. The square of the partial
correlation coefficient measures the pro-
portion of the variation of the dependent
variable unaccounted for by age, X2,
which has been explained by the addi-
tion of another independent variable.
Table 2. Simple and Partial Correlation
Coefficients Between Weeks of Unem-
ployment (Xi) and the Independent
Variables (i = 2, 3, 4,. . ., 9).
x.
Xi
Xr,
A-6
Xi
Xs
Xi
hi
.348
-.310
.317
.302
-.189
-.115
.081
.059
_
-.267
.241
.283
-.182
-.003
-.155
-.216
_
.071
.058
.080
.033
.00001
.024
.047
Table 2 indicates that Kochan is cor-
rect about the effect of age on the rela-
tionship between severance pay, Xg, and
duration of unemployment. But a con-
trary claim never was made in the
original article. However, Kochan has
guessed incorrectly about the effect of
"The variables in my article were defined
as follows: Xj = weeks of unemployment, Xj =
age, Xj = number of dependents, X, = other
weekly income, X5 = (0 - male, 1 - female), Xo
= weekly wage before termination, X, = years
of school, Xj = severance pay, and XB = years
of seniority.
COMMUNICATION 453
age on the relation between duration of
unemployment and other weekly income,
X4. Even when the effect of age is ac-
counted for, there is still a significant
correlation between the dependent vari-
able and other weekly income (ri4.2 =
.241). The square of the partial correla-
tion coefficient indicates that given the
proportion of the variance of Xj ex-
plained by age, Xj (about 12 percent),
the addition of other weekly income, X4,
explains nearly 6 percent more (r^n • 2 =
.058). This hardly represents to me the
"breakdown" of the association. Similar-
ly, age modifies (but hardly destroys)
the relationship between number of de-
pendents, X3, and sex, Xg, and the de-
pendent variable. It seems to me that
age acts truly as an intervening variable
only in the case of severance pay, Xg, and
seniority, Xg.
In conclusion, I only can reiterate my
belief in the essential validity of my
analysis and conclusions. I would join
with Kochan in hoping that other re-
searchers will enter the arena to help
us evaluate the effectiveness of schemes
designed to help the worker affected by
plant shutdowns.
DAVID B. LIPSKY
Assistant Professor
New York State School of
Industrial and Labor Relations
Cornell University

